Intertemporal substitution is at the heart of modern macroeconomics and finance as well as economic policymaking, but a large fraction of a representative population -those below the top of the distribution by cognitive abilities (IQ) -do not change their consumption propensities with their inflation expectations. Low-IQ men are also less than half as sensitive to interest-rate changes when making borrowing decisions. Low-IQ men account for more than 50% of the individuals and 50% of the labor income in our sample, which includes unique merged administrative data on cognitive abilities, economic expectations, consumption and borrowing plans, as well as total loan amounts from Finland. Heterogeneity in education, income, other expectations, and financial constraints do not explain these results. Limited cognitive abilities are human frictions in the transmission and effectiveness of economic policy and inform research on heterogeneous agents in macroeconomics and finance.
I Introduction
The consumption Euler equation is at the heart of modern dynamic models in macroeconomics and finance. Conventional monetary policy aims to stabilize the economy by changing interest rates, and hence households' consumption expenditure through intertemporal substitution. Intertemporal substitution is also central to the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy and conventional or unconventional fiscal policies.
1 Standard models and policies assume agents form their expectations rationally and react to changes in expectations. A recent example is forward guidance, which requires households to understand that keeping interest rates low until after the end of a liquidity trap will generate inflation, which should in turn increase current inflation expectations and hence the propensity to consume. Empirically, forward guidance is not as effective as representative-agent models imply (McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016) ).
Frictions must thus exist that hinder the transmission of policy through households, and in particular hinder households from increasing their consumption propensity when expecting higher inflation.
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In this paper, we document that limited cognitive abilities are human frictions to the effectiveness of economic policy. In a representative sample of Finnish men for whom we observe administrative data on cognitive abilities through IQ tests, only men with high cognitive abilities adjust their consumption propensities in response to changes in inflation expectations, even if everybody faces the same nominal interest rates.
3 High-IQ men are also twice as sensitive to changes in interest rates when making borrowing decisions compared to low-IQ men, at times of both increases and decreases of policy rates. Differences in income, education, borrowing constraints, or other expectations such as individual household income expectations cannot explain the heterogeneity in consumption and borrowing responses by IQ.
Men with low cognitive abilities are economically relevant because they represent more than 50% of the individuals and 50% of the income in our sample. The non-response to policy changes by these men is thus material to explaining the limited effectiveness of policy interventions implemented under the assumption that unconstrained households react.
We base our analysis on administrative individual-level data from Finland. Around age 20, all Finnish men take a standardized test of cognitive abilities when entering the mandatory military service. We observe the scores of all test takers between 1982 and
2001, which are provided as a standardized variable that follows a stanine distribution (integers from 1 to 9, with 9 being the highest) to allow cross-cohort comparisons. We match these test scores with the individual-level answers to the monthly harmonized European Commission consumer confidence survey (EC survey) from 2001 to 2015. This survey elicits inflation expectations, propensities to consume and borrow, as well as a rich set of demographics such as age, education, marital status, income, household size, and employment status for a set of repeated representative cross sections of Finns. In addition, we observe total debt outstanding at the individual level from tax records.
We build on these unique data and on the fact that cognitive abilities are an important determinant of households' expectations (see D'Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita, and Weber (2018) ) to assess the relationship between limited cognitive abilities and households' responsiveness to economic policy. As a first step, we study whether individuals adjust their consumption plans in line with the consumption Euler equation. We thus ask whether IQ levels relate to Finnish men's understanding of intertemporal substitution.
We estimate a set of multinomial logit regressions to study the relationship between inflation expectations and willingness to spend on durable goods. The EC survey asks how respondents think consumer prices will evolve in the following 12 months compared to the previous 12 months. 4 When we split the sample into high-IQ and low-IQ respondents, we find high-IQ respondents who think inflation will increase are almost 4% more likely relative to other high-IQ men to state it is a good time to spend. For low-IQ men, instead, we detect a negative and statistically insignificant association between inflation expectations and their readiness to spend. These results hold conditional on a rich set of demographics including education and income. Because low-IQ men do not react in line with the consumption Euler equation, these results suggest cognitive abilities could be a first-order impediment to the effectiveness of common fiscal and monetary policies that rely on intertemporal substitution.
One might worry low-IQ men are more likely to be financially constrained than high-IQ men, which would explain the insensitivity of their consumption plans to changes in real interest rates (see Zeldes (1989) ). Conditioning on household income does not affect any of our baseline results, and low-income households are plausibly more likely to be financially constrained than high-income households. We also confirm the baseline patterns when running our analysis separately for men above the median of the distribution by income, a subsample that includes both low-and high-IQ men.
Another potential concern is that expecting higher economic growth and hence higher household income might deliver a spurious positive relationship between the propensity to spend and inflation expectations. We can rule out this concern directly, because we observe individual income expectations elicited at the same time as inflation expectations.
We confirm our results when splitting the samples of high-IQ and low-IQ men into those men reporting positive or negative income expectations. These patterns in the data also rule out that individuals act on a subjective Phillips-curve relationship or that indirect effects of monetary policy explain our results (Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) ).
After documenting that men with low cognitive abilities do not behave in line with intertemporal substitution, we ask whether they react to changes in nominal interest rates, which are a cornerstone of conventional monetary policy. Central banks commonly lower nominal interest rates to stimulate consumption through household borrowing, and increase rates to avoid overheating. To tackle this question, we move on to test whether the relationship between individuals' propensity to borrow and changes in nominal interest rates varies systematically with individuals' cognitive abilities. 5 An advantage of our setting is our sample period includes two significant policy interventions on nominal interest rates in opposite directions. The European Central Bank (ECB), which has 5 Note we do not argue that reacting to changes in nominal interest rates is optimal for all households. Effective transmission of these monetary-policy interventions requires that households increase their demand for loans when nominal rates drop, and decrease their demand for loans when nominal rates increase, ceteris paribus. High-IQ men behave closely in line with this predicted pattern, because their propensity to take out loans increases when rates fall, stays constant while interest rates do not move, and lowers when interest rates rise. To the contrary, low-IQ men appear to be barely sensitive to changes in nominal interest rates when forming their borrowing plans, irrespective of the direction of the rate change. These results hold for the full sample as well if we limit the analysis to households that are unlikely to be financially constrained.
A differential pass-through of policy rates to individual borrowing rates for low-and high-IQ men might explain the differential borrowing sensitivities. A differential passthrough is an unlikely explanation because 95% of all mortages in Finland are adjustablerate mortgages with a spread on the 12-month EURIBOR, and mortgages represented 74% of all consumer debt at the end of 2014. Alternatively, low-IQ men might be shut-off financial markets which is why they do not care about changes in interest rates. Using registry data, we find individual leverage ratios that are almost constant across the IQ distribution. Finally, so far we have exclusively studied the association between inflation expectations, interest rates, and survey decisions. Even though low IQ men might not adjust their propensities to take out loans to changes in interest rates, it could still be the case high-and low-IQ men might adjust their actual decisions in similar ways. Financial advisor, for example, might call low-IQ men and tell them now is a good time to take out a loan given interest rates are all. Using annual tax data, we find high-IQ men adjust their total outstanding debt balances more to changes in interest rates.
The fact that men with low cognitive abilities are barely sensitive to monetary-policy interventions suggests human frictions might also be an important impediment to the transmission of traditional monetary policy.
In the last part of the paper, we study a set of (non-mutually exclusive) channels Because the tests for the first two channels do not provide us with a complete explanation of our results, we discuss a third channel we think might help explain our results in full, namely, the lack-of-economic-reasoning channel. Even low-IQ men who have the relevant information about the current state of the economy as well as accurate expectations for future economic states might still not substitute intertemporally, because they do not grasp the basic economic reasoning to understand intertemporal substitution, that is, how expectations about future inflation should reflect the incentives to consume and save today. The fact that low-IQ men might not understand the logic behind intertemporal optimization might also explain their excess sensitivity of consumption 5 to predictable income changes (see, e.g., Parker et al. (2013) ). This channel is in line with Ilut and Valchev (2017) , who model agents with limited cognitive knowledge of the optimal action conditional on the economic state. Similarly, low-IQ men might not grasp the basic economic reasoning for why changing nominal interest rates might affect their incentives to borrow over time, ceteris paribus.
In our setting, low-IQ men represent 50% of the overall income held in our sample, and hence their inaction is material to the effective transmission of fiscal and monetary policy. At the same time, our findings would have relevant policy implications even if the fraction of income accruing to low-IQ men was smaller. In fact, an important implication of our results is a potential redistributive role of monetary policy. Because low-IQ men do not adjust their consumption plans in response to changes in their inflation expectations and to changes in interest rates, common monetary-policy interventions might result in redistribution from men with low cognitive abilities to men with high cognitive abilities.
To the extent that cognitive abilities are largely innate or determined by environmental factors individuals can barely control in their early life, 6 this redistribution might be interpreted as a form of unintended yet undue discrimination of economic agents on the part of economic policymaking institutions.
A. Related Literature
Our paper is inspired by a recent literature on the forward guidance puzzle (see Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2015) ) -the fact that forward guidance is not as effective empirically as representative-agent models imply. Deviations from the representative-agent framework could possibly explain the limited effectiveness.
Borrowing constraints paired with uninsurable income shocks and asset holdings of different liquidity limit the scope of forward guidance and intertemporal substitution more generally (see McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016) , Kaplan, Weidner, and Violante (2014) , and Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) Our paper also relates to the large literature that emphasizes the stabilization role of inflation expectations. On the monetary-policy side, Krugman (1998) , Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , Eggertsson (2006), and Werning (2012) argue that a central bank can stimulate current spending by committing to higher future inflation rates during periods in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds. On the fiscal policy side, Eggertsson (2011 ), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011 ), Woodford (2011 , and Farhi and Werning (2015) show that inflation expectations can increase fiscal multipliers in standard New Keynesian models in times of a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. We add to this literature showing that cognitive abilities determine whether individuals adjust their consumption plans in response to inflation expectations.
We also contribute to a recent literature that uses micro-level data to study the relationship between inflation expectations and households' readiness to purchase consumption goods. Bachmann et al. (2015) start this literature using survey data from the Michigan Survey of Consumer (MSC). They find an economically small and statistically insignificant association between households' inflation expectations and their readiness to spend on durable consumption goods. Burke and Ozdagli (2014) Kumar (2015) advance this literature using experimental variation to study causally the effect on inflation expectations on economic decisions. Malmendier and Nagel (2009) show that personal experiences determine inflation expectations. D'Acunto, Malmendier, Ospina, and Weber (2017) use unique survey data from the Nielsen homescan sample to show shopping experiences shape inflation expectations and determine the gender bias in inflation expectations.
Our findings stress the importance of cognitive abilities to shape individual economic decision-making. Papers that document the role of IQ in financial decision-making are Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011) , who study the effect on stock market participation, Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012) , who study the effect on trading behavior, and Grinblatt, Ikäheimo, Keloharju, and Knüpfer (2015) , who study mutual fund choice. Agarwal and Mazumder (2013) relate cognitive abilities to suboptimal use of credit cards and home-equity loan applications. More recently, Aghion et al. (2017) use micro-level data on visiospatial IQ to study the effects of cognitive abilities, education, and parental income on inventiveness. Dal Bo, Finan, Folke, Persson, and Rickne (2017) relate IQ to the likelihood individuals enter political careers in Sweden. To the best of our knowledge, D'Acunto et al. (2018) is the first paper that shows cognitive abilities matter Weber (2018)).
Our findings also inform the literature on the take-up of economic programs. In the Great Recession, the U.S. administration initiated programs for underwater homeowners to refinance their mortgages, but the take-up rates were surprisingly low. Agarwal et al.
(2017) study the effects and take-up rates of the 2009 Home Affordable Modification
Program, which provided intermediaries with sizable financial incentives to renegotiate mortgages. They find a take-up rate of just one-third of the overall target population of indebted U.S. households. Moreover, Keys et al. (2016) show 20% of househoulds that are unlikely to be constraint fail to refinance their mortagages when interest rates decline.
Our findings suggest low cognitive abilities might help explain the limited effectiveness of these policies.
II Data
Our analysis uses three micro data sets that include individual-level information on macroeconomic expectations, consumption and borrowing plans, and 'cognitive abilities, as well as administrative information on household-level income, debt, and interest rates.
A. Expectations, Spending, and Borrowing Plans We use the answers to the following three questions in the survey to construct the variables capturing spending plans and inflation expectations and perceptions:
Question 6 By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop in the next 12 months?
Individuals can answer, "Prices will increase more rapidly," "Prices will increase at the same rate," "Prices will increase at a slower rate," "Prices will stay about the same," or "Prices will fall." We create a dummy variable that equals 1 when households answered, "Prices will increase more rapidly," to get a measure of higher expected inflation.
The question corresponds to question 6 in the harmonized EC survey.
Households' inflation expectations are highly correlated with their perception of past inflation (see Jonung (1981) ). We also use survey question 4 in our baseline analysis to disentangle the effects of inflation expectations from inflation perceptions:
Question 4 How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months?
Individuals can answer, "Prices have risen a lot," "Prices have risen moderately," "Prices have risen slightly," "Prices have stayed about the same," or "Prices have fallen."
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To study the association between inflation expectations and spending propsensities, we use the answer to the following question:
Question 10 In view of the general economic situation in Finland, do you think that now it is the right moment for people to make major purchases such as furniture, electrical/ electronic devices, etc.?
Households can answer, "It is neither the right moment nor the wrong moment," "No, it
is not the right moment now," or "Yes, it is the right moment now."
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We use the answers to the following question to study the propensity to take out loans in response to changes in nominal intererst rates:
Question 22 In view of the general economic situation in Finland, do you think that at the moment ...
Households can answer, "
It is a very bad time to borrow," "It is a pretty bad time to borrow," "It is a pretty good time to borrow,", or "It is a very good time to borrow."
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In addition, we use questions regarding expectations about general macroeconomic variables, personal income, and a rich set of socio-demographics from the Statistics Finland survey, which include gender, age, marital status, household size, income, employment status, number of kids, region of residence, and education levels.
The online appendix contains the original survey questions in Finnish. have an incentive to perform well.
B. Cognitive Abilities Data
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The test consists of 120 questions that attempt to test cognitive abilities in three areas -logical, mathematical, and verbal cognitive abilities. The FAF aggregates those scores into a composite measure of cognitive abilities, which we label collectively as IQ. The Finland is a very homogeneous country in terms of cultural background and opportunities. Education opportunities, including college education, are accessible to residents virtually for free. The country is also racially homogeneous, and our sample period does not cover the influxes of migrants that started around 2015 during the Syrian refugee crisis. Our setting is thus an ideal laboratory because our measures of IQ are unlikely to proxy for differences in cultural or environmental factors individuals could manipulate, but are more likely to reflect differences in innate abilities across individuals.
C. Income and Debt Data from Registries
We also have access to administrative income and debt data for all Finnish full-time The survey sample appears to be balanced between women and men. The median income is EUR 15,500 and the median respondent is 44 years old. About a third of respondents are single, 7% are unemployed, two-thirds have kids, 44% have a college degree, about a third lives in urban areas, and a quarter live in Helsinki. Fourty-eight percent of respondents think it's a good time to buy durables, 23% think it's a bad time, and the remainder think it's neither a good nor a bad time. ratios by IQ. Specifically, low-IQ men have a ratio of total debt to taxable income of 82%, which is slightly higher than the ratio for all bins up to a normalized IQ of 7. High-IQ men, instead, have a minimally higher leverage ratio of 0.93. In the bottom panel, we see the share of income that accrues to the indivual bins. Later in our empirical analysis, we will often split the sample into low and high IQ, with the latter defined as having a normalized IQ of 6 or higher. Note this implies low-IQ men make up 49.2% of total income and are therefore a large share of aggregate income and the economy.
D. Descriptive Statistics
The overall-cognitive-abilities test consists of three subparts that aim to measure different dimensions of cognitive abilities: a logical part, a verbal part, and an arithmetic part. In addition to the overall normalized IQ score, we also have the subscores from the FAF. Table 3 reports the correlations of these scores with the overall IQ score as well as with income. The overall IQ score has a correlation of around 0.85 with the subscores.
More interestingly, we also see that the measure of cognitive abilities we use has only a correlation of 0.15 with income, which is rather low.
III Inflation Expectations, IQ, and Consumption Expenditure
Most existing models studying fiscal and monetary policies assume a representative agent that has all available information, forms expectations rationally, and fully optimizes.
The consumption Euler equation is at the core of all modern dynamic models in macro and finance and predicts a positive association between consumption plans and inflation expectations; that is, if the agent expects higher inflation, he should substitute intertemporally and consume more now rather than later. In the textbook New Our baseline analysis focuses on this key building block that is instrumental to testing whether limited cognitive abilities hinder the transmission of economic policies.
We aim to test whether low-IQ and high-IQ individuals differ in the extent to which they update their consumption plans to changing inflation expectations, the consumption Euler 
A. Empirical Model
A common concern with survey-based measures of numerical inflation expectations is that households often report implausibly high levels of expected inflation. Moreover, many individuals report expected inflation rates as multiples of 5 or other round values, and a general upward bias exists, which is typically larger for women than for men (e.g., see Binder (2015) and D'Acunto et al. (2017)).
To avoid all the issues arising when using numerical inflation forecasts (see D'Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2018a) for a detailed discussion), we construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent expects a higher inflation rate in the following 12 months, compared to the prevailing inflation rate over the past 12 months, and zero otherwise.
D'Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2018a) show this measure tracks closely ex-post realized inflation across several samples in different countries and different time periods. A rationale for why this qualitative-based measure might track ex-post realized inflation more closely than quantitative measures is that respondents might have a clear idea of the directional changes in inflation they perceive and expect, but might be uninformed about the level of inflation prevailing at the time they are interviewed.
Our first outcome variable of interest, households' readiness to purchase durable goods, derives from discrete, non-ordered choices in a survey. We therefore model the response probabilities in a multinomial-logit setting.
We assume the answer to the question on the readiness to spend is a random variable representing the underlying population. The random variable may take three values, y ∈ {0, 1, 2}: 0 denotes it is neither a good nor a bad time to purchase durable goods, 1 denotes it is a bad time to purchase durable goods, and 2 denotes it is a good time to 15 purchase durable goods.
We define the response probabilities as P (y = t|X), where t = 0, 1, 2, and X is an N × K vector where N is the number of survey participants. The first element of X is a unit vector, and the other K − 1 columns represent a rich set of household-level observables, including demographics and expectations.
We assume the distribution of the response probabilities is
for t = 1, 2, and β t is a K × 1 vector of coefficients. The response probability for the case y = 0 is determined, because the three probabilities must sum to unity.
We estimate the model via maximum likelihood to obtain the vector β t of coefficients for t = 1, 2, and set the category y = 0 as the baseline response. We compute the marginal effects of changes in the covariates on the probability that households choose any of three answers in the survey, and report them in the tables.
B. Empirical Results: Baseline
To corroborate the accuracy of our data, we first estimate the relationship between inflation expectations and readiness to purchase durable goods in the overall sample, which includes both men and women. If the Euler-equation logic holds, we should observe a positive association between households' inflation expectations and their readiness to purchase durable goods. Table 4 reports the average marginal effects computed from the multinomial logit regressions of whether it's a good time to purchase durable goods on the dummy that equals 1 if the respondent thinks inflation will be higher in the following 12 months than it was in the previous 12 months. We cluster standard errors at the quarter level to allow for correlation of unknown form in the residuals across contiguous months. In all columns, we report the marginal effect of the inflation-increase dummy on the likelihood that individuals respond that it is a good time to buy durables. We always condition on perceptions of past inflation because they shape households' expectations about future inflation (Jonung (1981) ). 12 We see in column (1) that individuals who expect inflation to increase are on average 2.1% more likely to answer it is a good time to buy durables compared to individuals who expect constant or decreasing inflation.
Of course, large differences exist in households' purchasing propensities, which vary systematically by demographic characteristics (see, e.g., Attanasio and Weber (1993) ).
Household characteristics that determine both purchasing propensities and inflation expectations might be systematically related, and hence controlling for the observed heterogeneity across households is important to verify the associations we documented so far are not spurious. In column (2) of Table 4 , we add a rich set of demographics including age, age 2 , sex, marital status, log of income, employment status, number of kids, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki as covariates in the baseline specification. The baseline positive association between inflation expectations and readiness to purchase durable goods is unchanged.
Having established that the baseline positive association between inflation expectations and readiness to consume holds for the average individual in the full sample of men and women, we move on to consider the subset of male respondents for whom we observe cognitive abilities. This subsample amounts to about 17% of the overall sample.
When we repeat the specification of column (2) within this restricted subsample, we find a positive marginal effect of inflation expectations on consumption propensities, which is not statistically significant.
This nonresult between inflation expectations and purchasing propensities might camouglage large cross-sectional differences. To understand whether cognitive abilities might be relevant to explaining if households' consumption propensities react to changes in inflation expectations, we split the whole sample into men with an IQ above 5 and other men. In columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 , we repeat the analysis of column (3) separately for each of the two groups. Column (4) shows that in the subsample with high cognitive abilities, men are 3.6% more likely than over men with high IQ to say it is a good time to purchase durables when they expect inflation to increase. This result is consistent with 12 All results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar without conditioning on past inflation.
the conjecture that high-IQ men understand intertemporal substitution as well as the consumption-Euler-equation logic, and hence their consumption plans react to inflation expectations. When we move on to consider men with lower IQs (column (5)), we do find a negative but statistically insignificant marginal effect of inflation expectations on consumption propensities. Note that a statistical-power issue can barely explain this lack of reaction of the consumption plans of low-IQ men to inflation expectations, because the size of the samples in column (4) and column (5) are almost identical.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that men with high cognitive abilities, but not other men, adjust their consumption plans in response to inflation expectations in line with the consumption Euler equation.
C. Financial Constraints and Individual-level Shocks
Binding financial constraints are a compelling alternative interpretation of our results.
If low-IQ men are systematically more likely to be financially constrained than high-IQ men, low-IQ men's consumption plans might be insensitive to inflation expectations not because they do not understand intertemporal substitution, but because they cannot easily substitute their consumption expenditure intertemporally. To assess the relevance of this alternative interpretation, we repeat our baseline analysis, limiting the sample to respondents who are unlikely to be financially constrained. To proxy for the lack of financial constraints, we consider subsamples of respondents whose income is in the upper part of the income distribution. The rationale for this test is that financially-unconstrained respondents can substitute intertemporally if they realize doing so is convenient. Table 5 reports the marginal effects of expecting higher inflation on the willingness to purchase durable goods for respondents whose income is above the median income of men with IQ data (columns (2) and (3)) and whose income is above the 25 th percentile (columns (4) and (5)). In both cases, we replicate the baseline positive association between inflation expectations and readiness to spend on durable goods for high-IQ men. To the contrary, the consumption plans of low-IQ men appear to be insensitive to changes in inflation expectations even for those men who are unlikely to be financially constrained.
A second relevant concern is that income expectations might explain our baseline results, which could happen for several reasons. First, low-IQ men might have more negative expectations regarding other dimensions of their future personal outlook and/ or macroeconomic variables, which might mute their willingness to adjust future consumption plans in response to inflation expectations (Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel (2018) ).
For instance, low-IQ men who expect higher inflation might also be more likely than high-IQ men to expect a job loss over the following 12 months. In this case, a negative expected income shock might counteract the effect of higher inflation expectations on consumption plans. Second, high-IQ men might adjust their consumption plans according to their inflation expectations not because they have a Euler equation in mind, but because they also expect higher income following an individual Phillips-curve logic. Third, Kaplan et al. (2018) show in heterogeneous-agent models with uninsurable income shocks and assets of different liquidity that conventional monetary policy affects consumption decisions mainly through changes in income, because of indirect effects on labor demand.
To assess the relevance of these channels different from intertemporal substitution, we exploit the richness of our expectations data. The survey asks about individuals' expectations regarding any changes in their income over the following 12 months, which should capture any potential household-level or macro-level shocks that are likely to produce income effects at the household level. Table 6 replicates our baseline analysis using individual income expectations. In columns (2)-(3) of Table 6 , we focus only on respondents who expect their household income to increase over the following 12 months. Within this group, the consumption plans of high-IQ men react to inflation expectations, whereas the consumption plans of low-IQ men are insensitive to inflation expectations -if anything, the statistically insignificant association is negative. This result is direct evidence that even low-IQ men who do not expect any negative income shocks do not adjust their consumption plans in response to inflation expectations. In columns (4)-(5) of Table 6 , we move on to consider only respondents who expect their household income to stay the same or decrease over the following 12 months. Again, we detect the same patterns as in the baseline analysis, whereby high-IQ men adjust their consumption plans in response to inflation expectations, whereas the consumption plans of low-IQ men are insensitive to inflation expectations.
The results for high-IQ men suggest the consumer Euler equation plausibly explains our baseline results, wheres income effects based on a Phillips-curve logic or indirect effects of monetary policy are an unlikely explanation.
IV Interest-Rate Transmission to Loans
We saw in the previous section men with low cognitive abilities do not adjust their consumption plans in line with the predictions of a consumption Euler equation, which suggests conventional and unconventional monetary-and fiscal-policy measures might be less effective than a representative-agent model might predict. We now study the propensity to take out loans over time in response to changes in nominal interest rates by cognitive abilities. Conventional monetary policy uses short-term interest rates in an attempt to stabilize investment and consumption through credit or bank-lending channels.
Our data allow us to perform this test. From the survey, we observe respondents'
propensity to borrow through bank loans. Moreover, the time period our survey covers Before moving on to the multivariate analysis, we document the average propensity to borrow over time by high-IQ men and low-IQ men in response to changes in interest rates in the raw data. Individuals can answer that now is a "very good time to borrow" (4), a "pretty good time to borrow" (3), a "pretty bad time to borrow" (2), or a "really bad To control for systematic heterogeneity across low-IQ and high-IQ men other than cognitive abilities, as well as to assess the statistical significance of the differences in the reaction to changing nominal interest rates, we perform the analysis in a multivariate setting. We report the marginal effects for estimating specifications of the following type
where Loan i,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if respondent i in month t says it was a very good or pretty good time to take out a loan, and zero otherwise; IQ i,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the standardized IQ score of individual i is 6 or above; P ost t is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months after the ECB decreased or increased the facility rate, and zero in the months before the changes; and X is a vector of individual level controls including age, age 2 , gender, marital status, log of income, employment status, kids, urban versus rural classification, and a dummy for Helsinki. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model (OLS) as well as using non-linear estimators.
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results for estimating equation (2) for the period of January 2001 to June 2003, during which the ECB cut the deposit facility rate.
Whether we study the raw data across all estimation methods (columns (1)-(3)) or absorb demographic characteristics (columns (4)-(6)), we find that (i) on average, all respondents are more likely to think it is a good time to borrow after the cut in interest rates, but (ii) the propensity to borrow increases substantially more for high-IQ men than for low-IQ men. High-IQ men increase their propensity to take out loans by 100% and up to 150% more than low-IQ men, as can be seen by comparing the estimated coefficientsβ to the estimated coefficientsγ across all specifications.
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results for estimating equation (2) for the period July 2003 to December 2006, during which the ECB increased the facility rate. Consistent with the conjecture that high-IQ men react more to changes in policy rates, the estimated coefficientsβ are negative and statistically different from zero; that is, high-IQ men are substantially less likely than low-IQ men to claim it is a good time to take out a loan once nominal interest rates increase. Once we control for demographic heterogeneity, high-IQ men are about 3 times less likely to claim it is a good time to take out a loan compared to low-IQ men and compared to the period before the interest-rate increase.
The differential sensitivity in the propensity to take out loans to changes in nominal interest rates for men with high and low cognitive abilities both when interest rates decrease and when interest rates increase makes financial constraints an unlikely driver of these results. Alternatively, low-IQ men might be shut off from financial markets and do not care about changes in interest rates. But Panel B of Table 2 shows total debt to taxable income is almost constant across the IQ distribution. Note also that the survey question asks respondents whether it is a good time to take out a loan in general, and not whether it is a good time for their own households. Nevertheless, in the online appendix, we address these concerns directly by estimating equation (2) separately for men in the top fraction of the distribution by income, which includes households that are less likely to face financial constraints. The results of this robustness test, which we report in Table   A .1 of the Online Appendix, corroborate the view that differences in the reaction to policy changes across levels of cognitive abilities might be driven by a different ability to understand economic incentives and intertemporal substitution between high-IQ men and low-IQ men.
Moreover, a differential pass-through of policy rates to individual borrowing rates for low-and high-IQ men might explain our findings. For example, banks might systematically change interest rates more slowly for men with low cognitive abilities than for men with high cognitive abilities in response to changes in policy rates. This differential pass-through is an unlikely explanation because 95% of all mortages in Finland are adjustable-rate mortgages with a spread on the 12-month EURIBOR, and mortgages represented 74% of all consumer debt at the end of 2014.
Finally, so far we have studied exclusively the association between inflation expectations, interest rates, and survey decisions. Even though low IQ men might not adjust their propensities to take out loans to changes in interest rates, it could still be the case high and low IQ men might adjust their actual decisions in similar ways for 23 several reasons: (i) they might learn from family, neighbours, co-workers, or friends; (ii) supply-side forces might tell low-IQ men to adjust their decisions; for example, mortgage bankers might call these men and tell them now is a good time to take out loans given rates are low; (iii) they might be aware of their inability to optimize and rely on advice in general. To test whether we observe differences in the behavior between low-and high-IQ men also in actual choices, we use registry data from Statistics Finland. We observe for each individual at an annual frequency the amount of total debt outstanding for tax purposes. We then calculate the annual change in total debt and regress it on the change in the deposit facility rate estimating the following specification
where ∆debt i,t is the annual change in total debt of respondent i; ∆rates t is the annual change in the ECB deposit facility rate; IQ i,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the standardized IQ score of individual i is 6 or above; and X is a vector of individual level controls including age, age 2 , gender, marital status, log of income, employment status, kids, urban versus rural classification, and a dummy for Helsinki. IQ dummy equals one if normalized IQ is larger than 5. The sample period is 2001 to 2011. Table 8 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) reports the results for the sample from 2001 until 2011 when the change in the deposit facility rate reached 0. We see the estimate for the interaction term is negative and marginally statitically significant when we average out demographic controls. An increase in the deposit facility rate of 1% reduces the amount of total debt by 57 Euros more for men with IQ above 5 which is about 3% of the average change during our sample.
Of course, the recent Great Recession and European Sovereign Debt Crisis are major macroeconomic events during this sample period and might affect the changes in debt.
Columns (3) and (4) report results for a sample ending in 2007. Again, we see high-IQ men reduce their total debt more than low-IQ men. The estimate in column (4) when we partial out demographics equals around 4% of the average change in our sample.
The results in Table 8 are reassuring. Even in settings in which we only observe annual data, crude measures, and decisions subject to possibly countervailing forces, we still see differences in the actual behavior between high-and low-IQ men.
V Channels
In the previous sections, we provided arguments for why channels such as households' financial constraints or expectations about future economic conditions are unlikely to explain our findings. In this section, we further investigate a set of channels that could help explain why low-IQ men might be less responsive than high-IQ men to policy changes. To dig deeper into the costly information-gathering channel, we focus on a sample of men with perception errors below the median within each month. These men represent individuals who are likely to be informed about the prevailing inflation rate at the time of the interview, and due to the large sample size, they are unlikely to be individuals who merely guessed the prevailing inflation rates while providing values at random.
In column (1) of Table 9 , we find that high-IQ men within the group of men with low perception errors for contemporaneous inflation display a large positive and significant association between their inflation expectations and consumption propensities. The size of this association is higher than the size of the baseline association we detected in Table   4 . In column (2) of Table 9 , instead, we fail to detect any significant association between inflation expectations and consumption propensities for low-IQ men with low perception errors for contemporaneous inflation. This non-result suggests that even low-IQ men who are likely to be informed about macroeconomic variables do not display a behavior consistent with the Euler equation. These results might have important normative implications; that is, a mere policy of educating consumers about the level of current inflation might not be sufficient to increase the effectiveness of policy interventions.
The second channel we consider to explain why low-IQ men display no reaction to changing economic incentives is that they might be unable to think in probabilistic terms and about future states of the world. In this case, they might form miscalibrated expectations and have forecast errors that are too large. To assess the relevance of this channel, we focus on a subsample of men with forecast errors below the median forecast errors for inflation. We define forecast error as the difference between the expected numerical inflation rate over the next 12 months of individual i in months t and the ex-post realized inflation in 12 months. Intuitively, these men should be more able than others to think probabilistically and to come up with plausible assessments of plausible future macroeconomic conditions.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 also explain the excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable income changes (see, e.g., Parker et al. (2013) ). This latter channel, which we label the lack-of-economic-reasoning channel, is in line with Ilut and Valchev (2017) , who model agents with limited cognitive knowledge of the optimal action conditional on the economic state.
A last point to consider is the fact that many economists discard data on household inflation expectations because such data are noisy and sometimes extreme observations occur, which economists take as a sign that those data are unreliable. We agree with the notion that household-level inflation expectations are quite noisy, but disagree with the prescription that because of this noise, economists and policymakers should discard data on household expectations when conducting academic research or designing policies. The very fact that many policies rely on households reacting to higher inflation expectations by increasing their consumption propensities makes understanding which households have plausible inflation expectations and which households understand the theoretical link between inflation expectations and consumption propensities crucial for the effectiveness of economic policies.
The results in this paper show that many households might ignore fundamental assumptions of macroeconomic models and policymaking. Thus, policymakers should design policies in a way that is salient and easy to understand for the whole population if they want to promote policy effectiveness. Moreover, only by designing salient policies that guarantee everybody reacts as expected can policymakers avoid unintended consequences of policies, such as the unintended redistribution of financial resources from low-IQ men to high-IQ men due to the fact the former group does not react. An example of such a salient type of policy is unconventional fiscal policies, such as the pre-announcement of future value-added tax increases (e.g., see D'Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2018a)).
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VI Conclusion
We document a human friction to the transmission of economic policies -households' This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. Individuals' readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation expectation is a dummy variable which equals 1 when an individual replies that inflation will increase. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. The surveys ask representative samples of individuals on a monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Individuals can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. In this Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. Individuals' readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation expectation is a dummy variable which equals 1 when an individual replies that inflation will increase. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. The surveys ask representative samples of individuals on a monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Individuals can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. In this table we study the "it is a good time" outcome. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. High-IQ men are all men with the IQ scores above 5. Demographic controls are age, age 2 , sex, marital status, log of income, employment status, number of kids, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. We cluster standard errors at the quarter level. Columns (2) and (3) condition on having taxable income above the median income in the cross section and columns (4) and (5) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. Individuals' readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation expectation is a dummy variable which equals 1 when an Individual replies that inflation will increase. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. The surveys ask representative samples of individuals on a monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Individuals can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. In this table we study the "it is a good time" outcome. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. High-IQ men are all men with the IQ scores above 5. Demographic controls are age, age 2 , sex, marital status, log of income, employment status, number of kids, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. We cluster standard errors at the quarter level. Columns (2) and (3) condition on having a positive outlook regarding household income, and columns (4) and (5) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
where Loan i,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respond answers it is a good time to take out a loan, and zero otherwise; and P ost t is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months in which the ECB changes the deposit facility rate, and zero in the months before the change. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model (OLS) as well as using non-linear estimators. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
where ∆debt i,t is the annual change in total debt of respondent i; ∆rates t is the annual change in the ECB deposit facility rate; and X is a vector of individual level controls including age, age 2 , sex, marital status, log of income, employment status, number of kids, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. We use registry data from Statistics Finland to construct these variables. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. IQ dummy equals one if normalized IQ is larger than 5. The sample period is 2001 to 2011. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. Individuals' readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation expectation is a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household replies that inflation will increase. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. The surveys ask representative samples of individuals on a monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Individuals can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. In this table we study the "it is a good time" outcome. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. Demographics controls are age, age 2 , sex, marital status, log of income, employment status, number of kids, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. We cluster standard errors at the quarter level. Columns (1) and (2) condition on having an absolute perception error of current inflation below the median perception error, and columns (3) and (4) 
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I Survey Questions
Below we report the original survey questions we use in the analysis with answer choices in Finnish.
Question 4 Millä tasolla arvioitte kuluttajahintojen olevan Suomessa tällä hetkellä verrattuna hintoihin 12 kuukautta sitten. Ovatko ne mielestänne:
• 1 paljon korkeammat • 2 melko paljon korkeammat • 3 hieman korkeammat • 4 samalla tasolla • 5 alemmat?
• 6 eos Question 6 Miten arvioitte kuluttajahintojen muuttuvan Suomessa seuraavien 12 kuukauden aikana. Arveletteko, että hinnat:
• 1 nousevat nopeammin kuin tällä hetkellä • 2 nousevat samaa vauhtia kuin tällä hetkellä • 3 nousevat hitaammin kuin tällä hetkellä • 4 pysyvät nykyisellä tasolla • 5 laskevat nykyisestä tasosta?
• 6 eos Question 10 Jos ajattelette ensin yleistä taloudellista tilannetta Suomessa, niin onko mielestänne nyt edullinen aika ostaa kestokulutustavaroita, kuten huonekaluja, kodintekniikkaa, auto tms.?
• 1 on edullinen aika • 2 ei ole edullinen aika • 3 ei kumpikaan • 4 eos Question 22 Jos ajattelette taas yleistä taloudellista tilannetta Suomessa, niin onko tällä hetkellä mielestänne:
• 1 erittäin hyvä aika ottaa lainaa • 2 melko hyvä aika ottaa lainaa • 3 melko huono aika ottaa lainaa • 4 vai erittäin huono aika ottaa lainaa?
• 5 eos Loan i,t = α + βIQDummy i × P ost t + γP ost t + ζIQDummy i + X i.t δ + i,t ,
where Loan i,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respond answers it is a good time to take out a loan, and zero otherwise; and P ost t is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months in which the ECB changes the deposit facility rate, and zero in the months before the change. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model (OLS) as well as using non-linear estimators. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. IQ dummy equals one if normalized IQ is larger than 5. Demographic controls are age, age 2 , sex, marital status, log of income, employment status, number of kids, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. The sample period is January 2001 to December 2006. Statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
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